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INTRODUCTION 
Linda Bodewig enjoyed her job as a cashier at her local K-Mart 
in Oregon, and she had worked there without incident until the 
evening of March 29, 1979.1 That evening, she was ringing up the 
sale of some curtains for a customer named Alice Golden, but when 
she called out the price, Golden told her that the curtains were on 
sale and that Bodewig was overcharging her.2 Bodewig asked a 
coworker to go check the price of the curtains, and as Golden ac-
companied the coworker to go to the aisle where the curtains were 
displayed, Bodewig set aside Golden’s purchases and continued to 
check out other waiting customers.3 
Golden returned about ten minutes later, and then asked Bode-
wig what she had done with her money.4 Bodewig replied, “What 
money?” and Golden answered that she had left twenty dollars on 
top of the merchandise she had stacked on the counter, and that it 
was now missing.5 Golden became loud and argumentative, which 
soon attracted the attention of the K-Mart manager.6 After a check 
of the surrounding area and an audit of the cash register revealed 
no missing money, the manager then told Bodewig to accompany a 
female assistant manager to the women’s public restroom, where 
she would be strip-searched in order to prove to Golden that she 
didn’t have the money on her person.7 Golden was allowed to watch 
as Bodewig removed all her clothes except her underwear, at which 
point Golden said further disrobing was unnecessary, as she could 
see through Bodewig’s underwear and there was no money there.8 
Bodewig then returned to her work station at the checkout coun-
ter and completed her shift.9 When Bodewig came back to work the 
next day, however, she was told to work her register along with a 
second employee, which Bodewig understood to mean that she was 
under surveillance.10 Angry and embarrassed, Bodewig quit her job 
 
 1. The paraphrased description of this incident is taken from Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc.,  
635 P.2d 657, 658–60 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
 2. Id. at 658–59. 
 3. Id. at 659. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 660. 
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at the K-Mart when her shift ended that day.11 But rather than 
simply moving on, Linda Bodewig brought a tort action in the Or-
egon court for intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking 
damages against both her former employer and Golden.12 Bodewig, 
a modest woman in her twenties, alleged that as a result of her 
being subjected to a strip search and close monitoring by her em-
ployer, she experienced “two or three sleepless nights, cried a lot 
and still [got] nervous and upset when she [thought] about the in-
cident.”13 
Like numerous other courts around the country, the Oregon 
courts had recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress by the time Linda Bodewig brought her claim.14 Indeed, 
the notion that an employee could seek damages for the tort of out-
rageous conduct on the part of his or her employer was being in-
creasingly accepted in many state courts in the 1970s. In one of the 
first major cases, the 1970 decision of Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, 
Inc., the California Supreme Court held that the tort claim could 
succeed where an employer simply condoned the use of profane and 
abusive epithets made by a supervisor to his employees.15 Other 
courts soon followed California’s lead in taking a broad view of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claims.16 But Virginia 
courts would not be among them. For although the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is recognized in Virginia, the 
standards for successfully making the claim are extraordinarily 
high. While some state courts seem to have readily embraced the 
tort, Virginia courts have largely looked with disfavor on inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims.  
This Article first traces the development of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as applied to the workplace in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in Part I, and offers some observations 
about the significant hurdles a plaintiff may face in trying to suc-
cessfully hold an employer accountable for conduct that many in 
 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 658, 660. 
 13. Id. at 662. 
 14. See, e.g., Rockhill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 28, 29 (Or. 1971). 
 15. 468 P.2d 216, 217–18 (Cal. 1970). 
 16. For a comprehensive look at (and critique of) the emergence of the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress in the workplace, see Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against “Tortification” of Labor 
and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (1994). 
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our society would deem unacceptable. After reviewing the evolu-
tion of the doctrine since it was first recognized in Virginia nearly 
fifty years ago in Part II, Part III returns to the incident described 
above involving Linda Bodewig and her employer, and offers an 
analysis of how her case would likely be decided in the Virginia 
courts today—and whether that decision would be the right one.  
I.  EARLY RECOGNITION OF DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN 
VIRGINIA TORT CLAIMS 
The term “emotional distress” is not self-defining, and is one that 
historically has been viewed with some skepticism.17 This part 
traces the origins of tort claims for emotional distress in Virginia 
to show how the courts first dealt with the issue in the context of 
negligence and defamation claims, and how that analysis foreshad-
owed the development of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. As will be explored in the next section, the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, one that presents difficult issues, including what 
counts as “severe emotional distress” and how to calculate dam-
ages. However, it is important to note that damages for emotional 
distress had been sought by plaintiffs seeking recovery using tra-
ditional tort claims in Virginia for many years before the emer-
gence of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.  
One of the first Virginia cases to consider the question of 
whether the tort of negligence on the part of a defendant might 
subject him or her to damages arising from emotional distress suf-
fered by a plaintiff is Connelly v. Western Union Telegraph Co.18 In 
that 1902 case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia recog-
nized the claim of negligently inflicted emotional distress, but 
added that “mental anguish and suffering resulting from mere neg-
ligence, unaccompanied with injuries to the person, cannot be 
made the basis of an action for damages.”19 The plaintiff Connelly 
had not alleged any physical injury, only shock and outrage for the 
failure of Western Union to timely notify him of his father’s death 
 
 17. See, e.g., David J. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by 
Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 163–64 (1976–77) (noting that courts were 
initially reluctant to accept the idea of damages for emotional distress in the late 19th and 
early 20th century, reflecting the view that “insanity and other emotional illnesses were 
considered to be the result of one’s own sins”).  
 18. Connelly v. W. Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51, 53, 40 S.E. 618, 619 (1902). 
 19. Id. at 55, 65, 40 S.E. at 620, 624. 
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and subsequent funeral, and so the court dismissed his claim.20 
This became known as the “physical impact rule,” which limited 
the ability of plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress 
in negligence cases.21 
In addition to negligence claims, the Virginia courts considered 
the question of damages for emotional distress in defamation cases. 
The 1932 case of Bowles v. May22 is illustrative. In that case, a def-
amation claim was brought by a husband who was upset with his 
neighbor, Bowles, who had entered his house and insulted his wife, 
Mrs. May.23 The plaintiff also claimed that Bowles had spread ru-
mors among their neighbors about his wife’s alleged infidelity.24 A 
few days after this incident, Mrs. May suffered a stroke, and her 
husband sought damages for her mental suffering.25  
Although the court focused primarily on the question of whether 
a qualified privilege to defamation on the part of the defendant 
Bowles existed, the court went on to address the issue of independ-
ent recovery for willfully inflicted emotional distress, stating: 
There is a sharp conflict in the authorities as to whether there can be 
a recovery for fright or mental shock unaccompanied by contempora-
neous injury when the action is based upon mere negligence. However, 
it seems settled in Virginia that there can be no recovery for mental 
 
 20. Id. at 67, 40 S.E. at 624. The court adhered to the common law rule that damages 
for emotional distress alone, as an independent cause of action, were never allowed. The 
court added, however, that where there is a personal injury, emotional distress is a proper 
element of damages. Id. at 55, 40 S.E. at 620. 
 21. Although most states recognize a cause of action in tort for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, a minority of them adhere to the “physical impact rule,” which requires 
a contemporaneous physical injury or impact to recover for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Ju-
risdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of 
Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 792 (1988). “The pur-
pose of the rule requiring physical impact is to prevent ‘illusory or imaginative or faked’ 
claim.” Id. at 791 (quoting Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d. 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961)); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Today, the 
majority of states apply either the “zone of danger” or “physical manifestation” rules. See 
Marlowe, supra at 796–98, 796 n.91; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436, 
436A. The zone of danger rule permits recovery for emotional injuries resulting from wit-
nessing physical harm to another or from fearing physical harm to oneself, provided that 
plaintiff was actually threatened by physical harm. Marlowe, supra at 794, 799. The physi-
cal manifestation rule requires that a plaintiff exhibit a physical injury or symptom as the 
“direct and natural result of the initial emotional distress” suffered. Id. at 795.  
 22. 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932). 
 23. Id. at 424–28, 166 S.E. at 551–53. 
 24. Id. at 425, 166 S.E. at 552. 
 25. Id. at 424–26, 166 S.E. at 552. 
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anguish and suffering resulting from negligence unaccompanied by 
contemporaneous physical injuries to the person.26 
Rejecting the argument that calculating mental injuries is too 
difficult an endeavor for a court or a jury to undertake, and that 
the damages would more often be more assumed than real, the 
Bowles court held that  
severe mental shock may be the direct and proximate cause of wreck 
to the nervous system, the consequence of which may be a visible 
physical injury. When such fright is due to a wilful [sic], wanton and 
vindictive wrong, recovery is generally permitted, notwithstanding 
the fact that there is no contemporaneous injury from without.27 
However, the court held that Mr. May did not prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Bowles’ statements caused Mrs. May’s 
stroke, and reversed the trial court’s ruling in Bowles’ favor.28 
Returning to negligence claims, the “physical impact rule” an-
nounced in Connelly v. Western Union Telegraph Co.29 continued 
until 1973, when the Supreme Court of Virginia decided the case 
of Hughes v Moore.30 In that case, Toy Hughes crashed his car into 
the front porch of one Sue Etta Moore, who was standing inside her 
house looking through the window when she heard and saw 
Hughes’ car crash right in front of her.31 Moore sued Hughes for 
personal injury, and Moore’s physician testified at her trial that 
she was “experiencing physical pain in her body from the emotional 
disturbance and that her condition presented a serious mental 
problem.”32 He added that “[t]he pain was real, and ‘not imagi-
nary.’”33 Her physician further opined that “there was a ‘causal 
connection’ between the automobile striking plaintiff’s home and 
her emotional and physical condition.”34 
The Hughes court noted that Virginia courts had permitted re-
covery in the past for mental distress and physical injuries unac-
companied by actual physical contact where the injuries were 
 
 26. Id. at 433, 166 S.E. at 555. 
 27. Id. at 433, 437, 166 S.E. at 555–56. 
 28. Id. at 437–38, 166 S.E. at 557. 
 29. 100 Va. 51, 53–54, 40 S.E. 618, 619 (1902). 
 30. 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). 
 31. Id. at 28, 197 S.E.2d at 215. 
 32. Id. at 28–29, 197 S.E.2d at 215–16. 
 33. Id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216. 
 34. Id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216. 
2019] EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS 289
caused by a willful, intentional tort.35 The Hughes court cited as 
authority for the proposition that mental distress and physical in-
juries unaccompanied by actual physical contact could be grounds 
for recovery the earlier case of Moore v. Jefferson Hospital, Inc.36 
There, the actions of a hospital employee named Phyllis Hatter 
who entered an operating room and prevented a physician from 
performing surgery on the plaintiff were held to constitute an in-
tentional tort on her part, which, even without actual physical con-
tact with the plaintiff, caused him physical and mental injury.37  
The Hughes court then set out the new standard for negligence 
liability, rejecting the earlier “physical impact rule” (i.e., that a 
plaintiff could recover for emotional distress manifesting itself 
physically, but only if the negligence that caused the emotional dis-
tress also caused contemporaneous physical injury).38 The court 
held: 
[W]here conduct is merely negligent, not willful, wanton, or vindictive, 
and physical impact is lacking, there can be no recovery for emotional 
disturbance alone. We hold, however, that where the claim is for emo-
tional disturbance and physical injury resulting therefrom, there may 
be recovery for negligent conduct, notwithstanding the lack of physical 
impact, provided the injured party properly pleads and proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that his physical injury was the natural re-
sult of fright or shock proximately caused by the defendant’s negli-
gence. In other words, there may be recovery in such a case if, but only 
if, there is shown a clear and unbroken chain of causal connection be-
tween the negligent act, the emotional disturbance, and the physical 
injury.39 
The court concluded that Sue Etta Moore’s inability to feed her 
baby due to a lack of milk, the onset of her menstrual period while 
she was nursing, and her diminishing breasts—all resulting from 
her nervousness after witnessing Toy Hughes’ car crash into her 
home—constituted physical injuries naturally resulting from 
fright and shock.40 Thus, Hughes clarified that a plaintiff need not 
suffer contemporaneous physical injury (i.e., physical impact) to 
recover for emotional distress so long as the emotional distress 
 
 35. Id. at 29–30, 197 S.E.2d at 216–17. 
 36. Id.  at  29–30,  197  S.E.2d at 216–17 (citing Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., Inc.,  208 
Va. 438, 158 S.E.2d 124 (1967)). 
 37. Moore, 208 Va. at 441, 158 S.E.2d at 126–27. 
 38. Hughes, 214 Va. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219. 
 39. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219. In this way, the Virginia court joined the majority of 
jurisdictions in abandoning the “physical impact rule.” See supra note 21. 
 40. Hughes, at 28–29, 35, 197 S.E.2d at 215, 220. 
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physically manifested itself and there was an “unbroken chain of 
causal connection between the negligent act, the emotional dis-
turbance, and the physical injury.”41  
The evolution of mental distress claims arising from negligence, 
then, is one that gradually tipped more in favor of the plaintiff. 
Specifically, the abandonment of the “physical impact rule” in fa-
vor of a rule that looked at the natural consequences of witnessing 
something distressing meant that more plaintiffs could recover 
damages. That evolution might have boded well for plaintiffs when 
the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the new tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress just one year later; after all, 
if the court was willing to broaden the chances for plaintiffs to win 
damages for mental distress in the context of negligence claims, 
they might be willing to do so in other contexts as well. But as will 
be explained below, such was not to be the case. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS CLAIMS IN VIRGINIA 
Up until the mid-1970s, plaintiffs in Virginia could only recover 
damages for emotional distress arising from negligence cases, or 
the occasional defamation cases. But new possibilities opened up 
in 1974 when the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress for the first time in 
Womack v. Eldridge.42  
The specific facts of this case are remarkable. Rosalie Eldridge 
was employed by Richard Seifert and his attorney to obtain a pho-
tograph of Danny Lee Womack. Seifert’s attorney planned to use 
Womack’s photograph “as evidence in the trial of Seifert, who was 
charged with sexually molesting two young boys.”43 In order to ob-
tain a photograph of Womack, Rosalie Eldridge went to his home, 
telling him she was “a Mrs. Jackson from the newspaper and that 
she was writing an article on Skateland,” where Womack worked 
as a coach.44 He agreed to have her take his picture, and that pho-
tograph was later used as one of a series presented in court to the 
 
 41. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219. 
 42. 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974). 
 43. Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146. 
 44. Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146. 
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child victims of abuse in an effort to have them identify the perpe-
trator.45 Thus, Womack, who had absolutely no connection to the 
child molestation case, was placed in the position of possibly being 
accused by the victims in open court of committing a heinous 
crime.46 Even though the young boys did not identify Womack as 
the perpetrator, Womack argued that the mere use of his image in 
the court proceeding under these circumstances was outrageous 
conduct, falsely implicating him as a possible child molester.47 
The court recognized Womack’s claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and set forth the elements of the claim as fol-
lows: 
[A] cause of action will lie for emotional distress, unaccompanied by 
physical injury, provided four elements are shown: One, the wrong-
doer’s conduct was intentional or reckless. This element is satisfied 
where the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress or where he intended his specific conduct and knew or should 
have known that emotional distress would likely result. Two, the con-
duct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the gen-
erally accepted standards of decency and morality. This requirement 
is aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoiding litigation in situa-
tions where only bad manners and mere hurt feelings are involved. 
Three, there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s con-
duct and the emotional distress. Four, the emotional distress was se-
vere.48 
The court held that a plaintiff could recover in the absence of phys-
ical injury.49  
Applying the four elements of the tort, the court found that there 
was evidence that Eldridge’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, 
that a reasonable person would have “recognized the likelihood of 
the serious mental distress that would be caused in involving an 
innocent person [like Womack] in [a] child molest[ation] case[],” 
and that Womack’s emotional distress was severe.50 
There are two key hurdles a plaintiff must clear in order to suc-
cessfully claim intentional infliction of emotional distress: the sec-
ond and fourth elements of the tort. Assuming that the first ele-
ment—intentional action—is met, the plaintiff must meet the 
 
 45. Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146. 
 46. Id. at 339, 210 S.E.2d at 146. 
 47. Id. at 339–40, 210 S.E.2d at 146–47. 
 48. Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148. 
 49. Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148. 
 50. Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148. 
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second requirement, that of outrageous conduct.51 In both the em-
ployment and nonemployment contexts, the courts generally rely 
on Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which requires 
that the plaintiff prove that the defendant’s conduct was  
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one 
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the com-
munity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him 
to exclaim “Outrageous!”52 
This must be more than the hurt feelings or perceived slights 
that may occur in the typical American workplace. If the com-
plained-of conduct by a supervisor or other employer representa-
tive does not rise to the requisite level, it is dismissed as being 
among those “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 
oppressions, or other trivialities” to which the employee “must nec-
essarily be expected and required to be hardened.”53  
Not surprisingly, the court in Womack v. Eldridge held that 
Rosalie Eldridge’s conduct on behalf of her employer in subjecting 
Danny Lee Womack to potential incrimination as a child molester 
was outrageous.54 It is worth noting, however, that while the facts 
in Womack presented an extreme scenario, clearly meeting the sec-
ond element of the tort, the decision may have set such a high bar 
for what constitutes “outrageous conduct” that the Virginia courts, 
returning to Womack as a touchstone, might have viewed the cases 
that were to follow as falling short of the mark. In other words, 
since the seminal case for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress was based on such extraordinary facts, it is fair to ask to what 
extent subsequent cases that didn’t quite rise to the level of those 
extraordinary facts were somehow deemed less outrageous, and 
thus viewed in an unfavorable light towards the plaintiff. In this 
way, the second element of the tort may not have been an easy one 
to meet. 
Assuming the third element—causal connection—is met, some 
courts (including those in Virginia) have also set a very high stand-
ard in order to meet the fourth element, proof of severe emotional 
 
 51. Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148. 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Womack, 215 Va. at 342–43, 210 S.E.2d at 148–49.  
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distress.55 The Supreme Court of Virginia’s 1991 ruling in Russo v. 
White56 illustrates that difficulty. In that case, Patricia Russo went 
on a single date with Burton White, and then decided she did not 
want to date him again.57 He began stalking her, calling her house 
and hanging up on her 340 times in two months.58 Russo brought 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against White, 
alleging that as a proximate result of his intentional conduct, she 
experienced “nervousness, sleeplessness, stress and its physical 
symptoms, withdrawal from activities . . . [and] lack of concentra-
tion at work.”59 She argued that White’s conduct offended any 
sense of decency or morality, and that although White did not 
speak during the calls, both she and her daughter were threatened 
because of the frequency of the calls.60  
The Russo court had no trouble finding that White had acted in-
tentionally, thus satisfying the first element of the tort.61 Turning 
to the second element, the court elaborated on what constituted 
outrageous behavior, stating: 
[I]t is insufficient for a defendant to have “acted with an intent which 
is tortious or even criminal.” . . . Even if a defendant “has intended to 
inflict emotional distress,” or his conduct can be “characterized by 
‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to 
punitive damages for another tort,” the requirement of [outrageous-
ness] has not been satisfied. . . . “Liability has been found only where 
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized commu-
nity.”62 
The plaintiff was able to show a causal connection between 
White’s actions and her reaction, but she was not to succeed in her 
claim.63 Turning to the fourth element, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that Russo’s emotional distress did not rise to the level 
 
 55. The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Ruth v. Fletcher, 237 Va. 366, 377 S.E.2d 412 
(1989), noted that although Womack permitted recovery under a claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the Court was “careful to add limiting language” to the fourth 
element of the tort (severe emotional distress) so as to set a very high bar. Id. at 373, 377 
S.E.2d 416. 
 56. 241 Va. 23, 400 S.E.2d 160 (1991). 
 57. Id. at 25, 400 S.E.2d at 161. 
 58. Id. at 25, 400 S.E.2d at 161. 
 59. Id. at 25, 400 S.E.2d at 161–62. 
 60. Id. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162. 
 61. Id. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162. 
 62. Id. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 162. 
 63. Id. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 163. 
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of severity that was required to sustain her claim because she 
merely “alleged that she was nervous, could not sleep, experienced 
stress, . . . and was unable to concentrate at work.”64 Thus, the 
court found that the alleged effect was “not the type of extreme 
emotional distress that [was] so severe that no reasonable person 
could [have been] expected to endure it.”65 The court noted that:  
The term “emotional distress” travels under many labels, such as, 
“mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock . . . . It 
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, hor-
ror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disap-
pointment, worry, and nausea.” . . . But liability arises only when the 
emotional distress is extreme, and only where the distress inflicted is 
so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.66 
In rejecting Russo’s argument that her condition constituted se-
vere emotional distress, the court stated: “There is no claim, for 
example, that she had any objective physical injury caused by the 
stress, that she sought medical attention, that she was confined at 
home or in a hospital, or that she lost income.”67 These require-
ments, grafted onto the Restatement’s standard, meant that it was 
quite unlikely that a plaintiff would prevail, absent physical injury 
resulting from the outrageous conduct. 
Justice Hassell’s dissent in Russo focused on the majority’s find-
ing that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Womack requirement of 
severe emotional distress.68 “[N]o reasonable person could or 
should be expected to endure the injuries endured by Russo,” he 
stated.69 More importantly, the dissent took issue with the major-
ity’s finding that Russo alleged no objective physical injury.70 This 
was unnecessary, Justice Hassell explained, because “physical in-
jury is not an element required to establish the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”71 
 
 64. Id. at 27–28, 400 S.E.2d at 163. 
 65. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163. 
 66. Id. at 27, 400 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 67. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163. 
 68. Id. at 28–29, 400 S.E.2d at 163–64 (Hassell, J., dissenting) . 
 69. Id. at 29, 400 S.E.2d at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 30, 400 S.E.2d at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 30, 400 S.E.2d at 164 (Hassell, J., dissenting). Justice Hassell noted that 
Russo’s amended motion alleged significant emotional distress, as follows: “As a proximate 
result of defendant’s intentional acts, plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress resulting 
in nervousness, sleeplessness, stress and its physical symptoms, withdrawal from activities 
which might necessitate plaintiff leaving her daughter at home, lack of concentration at 
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This was an extraordinarily important addition: the Supreme 
Court of Virginia abandoned the “physical impact rule” for cases 
involving negligence with its 1973 ruling in Hughes v. Moore, but 
after recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims 
a year later in Womack v. Eldridge, the court subsequently pared 
back the scope of Womack with its 1991 holding in Russo v. White. 
In Russo, the court added the requirement that a plaintiff in an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress case prove “objective 
physical injury caused by the stress, [or] that she sought medical 
attention, [or] that she was confined at home or in a hospital,”72 
and  that  the  plaintiff  prove  the  tort  by  “clear  and  convincing 
evidence.”73  
To place this in a broader context, consider that in the 1970s, as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims began to be rec-
ognized by courts across the country, those courts at first required 
that whatever emotional distress the plaintiff might have experi-
enced manifest itself in some physical injury to the body, such as 
no longer being able to breast feed or suffering a significant weight 
loss—that is, a physical injury to the body resulting from the emo-
tional distress. In later decades, however, many state courts 
dropped this requirement and instead simply required objective ev-
idence of mental distress.74 This distinction is important, as the 
objective evidence could simply be testimony from a doctor that the 
plaintiff was suffering from nightmares, or dizziness, or experi-
enced periods of sadness and depression. These constitute “objec-
tive evidence of emotional distress” but not a “physical injury to 
the body.” But in Virginia, Russo represented a tightening of the 
tort’s requirements, adhering to a physical injury standard at a 
time when other courts seemed to be more open to claims of emo-
tional distress.75 
 
work to the point where she received a reprimand.” Id. at 29, 400 S.E.2d at 164. 
 72. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 163.  
 73. Id. at 28, 400 S.E.2d at 162. 
 74. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Cambridge Hous. Auth., 823 N.E.2d 1249, 1254–55 (Mass. 
2005) (failing to change door locks on rental property which allowed home invasion to take 
place caused shock to plaintiff who witnessed harm to a loved one; shock was sufficient to 
constitute severe emotional distress); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59 P.3d 611, 620 (Wash. 
2002) (employee who was mocked for her back injury and was called vulgar names suffered 
severe emotional distress); GTE Southwest Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605–19 (Tex. 1999) 
(employees who were harassed by supervisor experienced anxiety and fear, sought medical 
treatment, and were prescribed medication to alleviate their problems suffered severe emo-
tional distress). 
 75. Not that Virginia courts were alone in tightening the standard. For example, in 
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Against this background, we now turn to application of the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress tort in the Virginia work-
place. 
A.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in the 
Workplace 
The Virginia courts have considered a number of cases in which 
employees or former employees have brought claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against their employers. Five cases 
are discussed in chronological order below. Unfortunately for the 
plaintiffs in each of these cases, the Virginia courts refused to rec-
ognize the workplace actions they complained about as rising to 
the level of “outrageous conduct.” As the cases demonstrate, some-
times employees are subject to rude, unfair, or demeaning treat-
ment by their supervisors, but that does not mean they can meet 
the  standard  for  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress  in  
Virginia. 
In our first case, plaintiff Fred Seitz was faced with a choice of 
resignation or termination by his employer, Phillip Morris.76 Alt-
hough Seitz had worked for Phillip Morris for more than eight 
years, had received several promotions, and was the recipient of 
excellent performance evaluations, he was called into his immedi-
ate supervisor’s office one day and was “informed . . . without more 
specific detail of numerous complaints that had surfaced in recent 
weeks regarding the way and manner [in which] he conducted him-
self with vendors.”77  
His supervisor told him that if he resigned, “he would get sever-
ance and vacation pay, and the [company] would tell potential em-
ployers he resigned.”78 If he was terminated, however, then he 
would not get any benefits and prospective employers would be told 
 
1992 the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27–28 
(N.C. 1992), that a plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim had to 
show a severe and disabling injury, defining the term “severe emotional distress” to mean 
“emotional or mental disorder, such as . . . neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, 
or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be gen-
erally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.” Id. at 26, 28. The plaintiff 
in Waddle merely was upset, angry, and had trouble sleeping, and thus failed to demon-
strate that she experienced “severe emotional distress.” Id. at 28. 
 76. Seitz v. Philip Morris, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 428, 428 (1986) (Richmond City). 
 77. Id. Seitz’s supervisor would only say that he “used coercive and unethical tactics” 
in dealing with the vendors. Id. 
 78. Id.  
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of the alleged problems Sietz experienced with vendors.79 Not sur-
prisingly, Seitz chose to resign.80 Soon thereafter, however, he 
brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against Phillip Morris.81 
The court held that Seitz’s claim failed to meet the first element 
of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort—specifically, 
that there was no allegation of a specific purpose on the part of 
Seitz’s supervisor “to inflict emotional hurt or an allegation defend-
ant so intended his specific conduct or knew or should have known 
emotional injury would result thereby.”82  Thus,  the  defendant 
employer’s  demurrer  to  his  count  of  emotional  distress  was 
sustained.83 
Our second case involved former employee Joseph Ellison, who 
brought a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against his former employer, St. Mary’s Hospital in Richmond, al-
leging that he had been treated so badly that he had to leave his 
employment.84 Ellison claimed the hospital “gave him unfair work 
assignments, criticized his work in front of others, told him he had 
an ‘attitude problem,’ took him into an office and questioned him 
about drug use, gave him a choice of submitting his resignation or 
being fired, and barred him from the hospital grounds.”85  
The court held that Ellison’s allegations, even if true, did not rise 
to the level  of  “extreme and  outrageous”  conduct  needed  to  
prevail under Virginia  precedent.86  The court  stated  that  El-
lison’s allegations 
do no more than detail a scenario carried out daily in the workplace. 
Every day, workers are criticized about their job performance and are 
undoubtedly given assignments which they feel are unfair and not 
part of their job description. Such conduct can hardly be given the dig-
nity of being elevated to the level of “outrageous and intolerable in 
that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency 
and morality.” To make such actions as plaintiff alleges actionable 
would be to create chaos in the work place. Workers must not be so 
 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  at 428, 431. 
 82. Id. at 431–32. 
 83. Id. at 432. 
 84. Ellison v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 8 Va. Cir. 330, 330–31 (1987) (Henrico County). 
 85. Id. at 332. 
 86. Id. at 331. 
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thin-skinned as to allow themselves to be unnerved by the rough and 
tumble of everyday life.87 
Our third case involved a plaintiff named Lorine Spence, who 
brought an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
against her employer, arguing that the company’s failure to make 
timely payments mandated by the Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia as a result of Spence’s job injury award was outrageous con-
duct.88 The court disagreed, stating that the employer’s “failure to 
make payments and subsequent filing of court actions and appeals 
questioning liability simply does not equate with the extreme and 
outrageous conduct necessary for an emotional distress claim with-
out accompanying physical injury described in Womack.”89 
 In our fourth case, a former employee of the Norfolk Sheriff’s 
Department, Queen Starks, brought an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim against her former employer,90 alleging 
that a co-worker, Diane Woods, had stated to other employees that 
Starks was a lesbian and had said to her that she didn’t want an-
other employee to “catch anything” from her.91 Applying the Russo 
standard, the court rejected Stark’s claim, stating: “Instances of 
pettiness, vindictiveness, rudeness, and mendacity among employ-
ees of large organizations and, indeed, among mankind, are innu-
merable.”92 The court concluded that the acts in question were “not 
so outrageous and extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency.”93  
The court also found Starks’ claim wanting with respect to the 
fourth element of the tort, severe emotional distress, noting that 
Starks only alleged severe emotional distress and severe depres-
sion, which the court defined, with the help of Webster’s Diction-
ary, as “[d]ejection; sadness; [or] gloom.”94 Stated the court: “Dejec-
tion, sadness, and gloom are emotions almost everyone who enters 
the workplace suffers at some time. Without more, they are hardly 
 
 87. Id. at 332. 
 88. Spence v. E.S.I.S., Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 366, 366–67, 372 (1989) (Virginia Beach City). 
The court added that since Spence had failed to meet one of the prongs of the Womack test, 
it need not look to the other three. Id. at 372–73 (citing Johnson v. McKee Baking Co., 398 
F. Supp. 201, 209 (W.D. Va. 1975)). 
 89. Id. at 373. 
 90. Starks v. McCabe, 49 Va. Cir. 554, 554 (1998) (Norfolk City). 
 91. Id. at 555. 
 92. Id. at 558–59. 
 93. Id. at 559. 
 94. Id. 
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‘so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure’ 
them.”95 The court ruled that Starks’ “bare assertion”96 that her co-
worker’s statements caused her “severe emotional distress and se-
vere depression” did not satisfy the fourth element, and sustained 
the defendant employer’s demurrer.97 
Finally, we have the 2011 case of Paul Blakeman, who brought 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against his em-
ployer when he was fired for testing positive for cocaine as a result 
of a random drug test.98 Blakeman complained that his employer 
failed to adhere to the in-house collection procedure and then re-
fused to invalidate the drug test.99 The court held that requiring 
an employee to submit to a random drug test did not constitute 
outrageous conduct; thus, Blakeman did not meet the second prong 
of the four part test.100 Further, the court held, Blakeman did “not 
allege any objective physical injury caused by the stress” of having 
to take a drug test, nor did he require medical attention, and thus 
he did not meet the fourth prong of the test either.101  
As is seen from these decisions, Virginia employees typically do 
not prevail in their intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims. Faced with the high standard of meeting the second ele-
ment of the tort—“outrageous conduct”—as set forth in Womack, 
coupled with the fourth element’s physical injury standard set 
forth in Russo, it would appear that the Virginia courts are willing 
to abide a wide range of mistreatment by employers without find-
ing liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.102 How-
ever, in recent years a line of cases has developed in which Virginia 
employees have had greater success against their employers: 
claims involving sexual harassment. We turn to those cases in the 
following section. 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Blakeman v. Emergency USA, 83 Va. Cir. 269, 269–70 (2011) (Fairfax County). 
 99. Id. at 270. 
 100. Id. at 278–79. 
 101. Id. at 278. 
 102. As these cases show, the fourth element of the tort, severity, “is perhaps the most 
difficult to apply to the facts of a case.” Calloway v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. Cir. 400, 417–
18 (2018) (Augusta County) (plaintiff, a visitor to a prison, “was upset, and crying” and 
“shocked, frightened, and felt degraded and humiliated” when she was subjected to a strip 
search, but the court rejected her claim that she suffered severe emotional distress).  
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B.  Development of the Russo Exception: Sexual Harassment and 
Employer Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress  
A number of cases show that sexual harassment claims that 
arise in the workplace will be treated differently than might be ex-
pected under the Russo doctrine. As noted above, Russo v. White 
stands for the proposition that allegations of stress, humiliation, 
embarrassment, injury to reputation, and mental anguish unac-
companied by objective physical injury, medical attention, or lost 
income are not sufficient to support a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotion distress.103 But what if an employee brings a sexual 
harassment case framed as a tort claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress? The answer has changed over the course of the 
last two decades. 
In 1991, the Richmond City Circuit Court decided the case of 
Hazlewood v. Mabe.104 There, employees of Richmond Newspapers 
claimed that a coworker, Mabe, “made undesirable, sexually sug-
gestive physical contact with [them]; namely, in the form of pinch-
ing, grabbing, and/or fondling the plaintiff’s posterior or genitals, 
in a sexually suggestive manner.”105 The plaintiffs alleged Mabe’s 
conduct “detrimentally affected their psychological well-being and 
has consequently interfered with their ability to adequately per-
form their duties in the work place . . . and that the plaintiffs have 
each suffered tremendous emotional distress, both at the work 
place and intruding on their home lives.”106 Applying the Russo 
standard, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show se-
vere distress, such as objective physical injury, seeking medical 
treatment, home or hospital confinement, or lost wages, and 
granted the defendant employer’s demurrer.107 
A significant shift began a few years later, however, with the 
1997 decision in Hygh v. Geneva Enterprises, Inc.108 That case in-
volved Vernetta Hygh, a receptionist at a car dealership called Ge-
neva Enterprises.109 Her supervisor, a general sales manager 
 
 103. Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991). 
 104. 24 Va. Cir. 289 (1991) (Richmond City). 
 105. Id. at 290. 
 106. Id. at 293. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 47 Va. Cir. 569 (1997) (Fairfax County). 
 109. Id. at 570. 
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named Beltran, continually subjected Hygh to “sexually sugges-
tive, harassing comments and acts.” Beltran’s harassment culmi-
nated on August 23, 1996, when, during work hours and upon Bel-
tran’s suggestion, Hygh and Beltran first drove to a store and 
purchased a CD for Hygh to play in her car.110 Rather than return-
ing to the car dealership, however, Beltran drove to a secluded 
spot, parked the car, grabbed Hygh by the neck and attempted to 
force her to perform a sex act on him.111 She resisted, and then re-
signed from her job a few days later.112 
Hygh brought a number of claims against Beltran and the com-
pany, including a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, before the Fairfax County Circuit Court.113 The employer de-
murred, arguing that Hygh failed to plead the necessary elements 
of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under 
Hughes—specifically, that she did not sufficiently allege the re-
quired elements of intentional conduct, a nexus between defend-
ant’s conduct and the emotional distress, nor the severity of the 
distress.114  
Hygh argued that her claim satisfied the necessary elements, 
and “that the only element in question [was] whether [her] emo-
tional distress was severe.”115 She “alleged ‘objectively verifiable 
evidence’ of her distress including, but not limited to, inability to 
return to work or college and consultation with mental health care 
professionals.”116  
The court held that a victim of sexual assault experiences 
trauma which greatly differed from the type suffered by the plain-
tiff in Russo, in which the court required a showing of physical in-
jury resulting from the outrageous conduct.117 Rather, held the 
court, the plaintiff, “an alleged victim of sexual assault, need not 
plead with graphic specificity any additional objective physical in-
jury.”118 The court said: “The victim of a sexual assault clearly ex-
periences severe emotional distress that no reasonable person 
 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 570, 574. 
 112. Id. at 570. 
 113. Id. at 569. 
 114. See id. at 569, 571. 
 115. Id. at 574. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 574–75. 
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could be expected to endure.”119 Therefore, the employer’s demur-
rer was overruled and Hygh could pursue her claim, even without 
a showing of physical injury.120 
A case that arose three years later, Padilla v. Silver Diner, in-
volved a server named Annamarie Padilla who worked at the Sil-
ver Diner restaurant.121 For the entire eleven months she worked 
there, Padilla was subjected to continuous sexual harassment by a 
co-worker at the restaurant, Dominic Williams.122 He “proposi-
tion[ed] her on numerous occasions in an extremely vulgar man-
ner,” spanked her rear end, placed his face against her breasts, 
asked her when they were going to have sex, and once caused her 
to burn herself when he pushed her against a hot oven.123 
Padilla repeatedly told Williams that she was not interested in 
him and was offended by his behavior.124 She complained to her 
supervisor and the operating manager at the restaurant several 
times.125 Other wait staff also complained about Williams and 
other employees, and even brought their complaints to the presi-
dent and vice president of the company, but no action was ever 
taken.126 Finally, Padilla stopped working at the Silver Diner, and 
brought her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against Williams and the company, claiming liability under the 
theory of respondeat superior.127 She filed her claim in Virginia 
Beach City Circuit Court.128 
As in the Hygh case heard in Fairfax County, the Virginia Beach 
City Circuit Court held that although Russo v. White stands for the 
proposition that “allegations of stress, humiliation, embarrass-
ment, injury to reputation, and mental anguish unaccompanied by 
objective physical injury, medical attention, or lost income are not 
sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
 
 119. Id. at 575. 
 120. Id.  
 121. 63 Va. Cir. 50, 51 (2000) (Virginia Beach City). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 51. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 51–52. 
 128. Id. at 51. 
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distress,”129 there was an exception to this rule. Specifically, stated 
the court, 
Russo and its progeny addressed emotional distress claims that were 
“independent of any physical injury and unaccompanied by any phys-
ical impact,” . . . and clearly differ from cases involving physical or 
sexual assaults . . . . In the cases at hand, the Plaintiffs have suffi-
ciently alleged physical and emotional injuries resulting from physical 
and sexual abuse by Williams and Miller. It is apparent that Miller’s 
and Williams’ alleged conduct was so outrageous and offensive as to 
cause the Plaintiffs severe emotional distress as well as physical inju-
ries . . . . Additionally, the Plaintiffs told Williams and Miller on mul-
tiple occasions that their conduct was unwelcome, and it may be in-
ferred that Williams and Miller intended to cause the Plaintiffs 
distress by continuing to sexually assault and harass them. Accord-
ingly, the Defendants’ demurrer is overruled.130  
Then, in a case decided the same year, Oelgoetz v. Appalachian 
Appraisal Services, Roanoke City Circuit Court held that where a 
female supervisor had engaged in unwanted propositioning of a 
male subordinate, his claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress properly survived the defendant’s demurrer, even though 
the court expressed skepticism about whether her conduct was 
“sufficiently ‘extreme and outrageous’ to overcome a Motion for Di-
rected Verdict at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s evidence.”131  
In 2005, in Hazzis v. Modjadidi the Norfolk City Circuit Court 
heard extensive allegations of sexual harassment brought by den-
tal hygienist Magdalend Hazzis.132 Specifically, she alleged that 
Dr. Osama Modjadidi, a dentist and employee of Konikoff Family 
Dentistry, used his position of authority to “forcibly rub[] his body 
against hers, unsnap[] her bra when her hands were engaged with 
the film processor,” touch her buttocks and breasts, and make “sev-
eral offensive sexual remarks.”133 She claimed that this sexual har-
assment caused her “extreme mental and emotional anguish, phys-
ical injuries, and medical expenses.”134 
The court compared the sexual harassment claim in Padilla to 
the claim brought by Ms. Hazzis, and determined that the physical 
injuries in Padilla were more pronounced than those complained 
 
 129. See id. at 55; see also Russo v. White,  241 Va. 23, 28, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1991). 
 130. Padilla, 63 Va. Cir. at 55 (citation omitted). 
 131. 51 Va. Cir. 334, 334–36 (2000) (Roanoke City). 
 132. 69 Va. Cir. 385, 385 (2005) (Norfolk City). 
 133. Id. at 385–86. 
 134. Id. at 386.  
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of by Ms. Hazzis.135 But joining the other three circuit courts, the 
Norfolk Court held that their reasoning was analogous.136 “Cases 
dealing with elements of physical sexual harassment are distin-
guishable from cases like Russo where the allegations dealt only 
with non-tactile torts.”137 The court concluded that the “egregious-
ness and physical nature of the alleged conduct, along with the 
plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress to the point of vomiting 
blood [were] sufficient to overrule the Defendant[] [employer’s] de-
murrers.”138 
The most recent case of this type was decided in 2012. There, in 
Magallon v. Wireless Unlimited Inc.,139 the Fairfax County Circuit 
Court, relying on its earlier ruling in Hygh, found that the plaintiff 
alleged outrageous and intolerable behavior when she claimed her 
former manager called her sexually demeaning names, threatened 
her with violence, demeaned her character by accusing her of hav-
ing sexual relations with the business owner, and took her car and 
house keys when she rebuffed his sexual advances.140 The plaintiff 
had “sought medical attention for her fear, anxiety, depression, 
and frequent vomiting . . . . [and] was prescribed Zoloft and another 
medication  to  control  her  vomiting”  and  post-traumatic  stress 
disorder.141 
As seen from these decisions, the Virginia circuit courts have 
evolved in their view of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims involving sexual harassment in the workplace. Although it 
is sometimes the case that the victim of sexual harassment can 
demonstrate the type of physical injury and need for medical at-
tention envisioned by Russo, these courts seem to demonstrate 
quite a sympathetic view towards plaintiffs who do not produce 
that level of evidence. As the Hygh court stated, a sexual assault 
 
 135. Id. at 388–89. 
 136. Id. at 389. 
 137. Id. at 389.  
 138. Id. 
 139. 85 Va. Cir. 460 (2012) (Fairfax County). 
 140. Id. at 462–63, 468–69. 
 141. Id. at 463. 
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victim “need not plead with graphic specificity any additional ob-
jective physical injury,”142 as sexual assault victims experience “se-
vere emotional distress that no reasonable person could be ex-
pected to endure.”143 
 Before we return to the plight of Linda Bodewig set forth at the 
beginning of this article, a brief detour is in order: what role does 
Workers’ Compensation play in these cases? 
C.  The Relationship Between the Virginia Workers’ Compensation 
Act and Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Briefly stated, the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act provides 
benefits for injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment.144 The Act provides the exclusive remedy for employ-
ees seeking relief from such injuries, but both conditions must be 
met; that is, the injury must both arise out of the employment and 
in the course of employment.145 In other words, as the Supreme 
Court of Virginia held in its first decision interpreting the Act, 
Bradshaw v. Aronovitch,146  
[t]he expressions “arising out of” and “in the course of” the employ-
ment are not synonymous; but the words “arising out of” are construed 
to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and the words “in the 
course of” to refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which 
it occurred. 147  
Elaborating on these terms, the Bradshaw Court explained that 
“[a]n accident occurs ‘in the course of the employment’ when it 
takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where 
the employee may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably ful-
filling duties of his employment or engaged in doing something in-
cidental thereto.”148 Further, the court found, the Act requires “a 
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is 
 
 142. Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 51 (2000) (Virginia Beach City) (quoting Hygh 
v. Geneva Enters., Inc., 47 Va. Cir. 569, 575 (1997) (Fairfax County)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 2017 & Cum. Supp. 
2019). 
 145. Id. § 65.2-307 (Repl. Vol. 2017 & Cum. Supp. 2019). 
 146. 170 Va. 329, 196 S.E. 684 (1938). 
 147. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. 
 148. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. 
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required to be performed and the resulting injury.”149 The court ex-
plained that “if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural 
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasona-
ble person familiar with the whole situation . . . then it arises ‘out 
of’ the employment.”150 The Act, however, “excludes an injury 
which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing 
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the 
workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employ-
ment.”151 In other words, the danger to which the employee is ex-
posed must be “peculiar to the work and not common to the neigh-
borhood.”152  
So what does this mean for an employee working in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia who suffers what he or she believes to be 
severe emotional distress stemming from the outrageous conduct 
of an employer? The answer depends on whether the court finds 
that the complained-of action meets the Act’s definition of an acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of employment.  
For example, in Abney v. Wimer, the court considered the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim brought by Kimberly 
Abney against her employer, the J.C. Penney Company.153 Abney 
was summoned to her supervisor’s office, where she was informed 
that she was fired.154 Her supervisor then enlisted the aid of an-
other employee, Nevin Wimer, in escorting Abner out of his office 
and off the store premises.155 Abney claimed that Wimer assaulted 
her and “forcibly lifted her up and out of the chair and intentionally 
threw [her] to the floor causing [Abney] to break three bones in her 
right foot.”156 
The employer argued that Abney’s intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress tort claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of 
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, and the court agreed.157 
Stated the court: 
 
 149. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. 
 150. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. 
 151. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. 
 152. Id. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. 
 153. 60 Va. Cir. 87, 87 (2002) (Norfolk City). 
 154. Id. at 87. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 87–88. 
 157. Id. at 88, 91. 
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Every event in this scenario, the Plaintiff’s going into her supervisor’s 
office to discuss a work-related matter, the termination, and the re-
quests that Plaintiff depart from the premises, was work-related and, 
therefore, arose out of her employment. Even the alleged assault arose 
out of Plaintiff’s employment, for it involved a work-related matter.158 
 Thus, the court found that Abney’s injuries “arose out of [her] 
employment” with defendant J.C. Penney.159 Further, Abney’s in-
juries occurred at her place of employment, during working hours, 
and in circumstances directly related to her employment—or at 
least directly related to her discharge from employment.160 Her ex-
clusive remedy, therefore, was under the Virginia Workers’ Com-
pensation Act (which, of course, limited her potential damages, un-
like an intentional tort claim).161 
By contrast, in Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance Co., an em-
ployee named Texanna Middlekauff brought an action against her 
employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming 
from harassment and verbal abuse from her supervisor.162 Specifi-
cally, she alleged in her complaint that her supervisor, Tony Rich-
ards, “intentionally sought to humiliate her in front of other em-
ployees by making derisive comments concerning the fact that she 
was overweight, as well as sexist and other belittling remarks.”163 
The trial court held that the action was barred by the exclusivity 
provision of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act,164 but the 
Supreme Court of Virginia held that her claim was not barred by 
the exclusivity provision because she did “not allege an ‘injury by 
accident’ ‘arising out’ of her employment.”165 Thus, the exclusivity 
provision did not bar Middlekauff’s action and she could proceed 
with her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against 
the defendant employer.166 
The same result was reached with respect to the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim arising out of the sexual harass-
ment in Padilla v. Silver Diner,167 the case discussed earlier where 
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the waitress was continually harassed by her supervisor for more 
than a year. There, the court held: 
The Act applies to injuries by accident arising out of and in the course 
of employment and occupational diseases. An injury is “by accident” 
when it (1) “appeared suddenly at a particular time and place and 
upon a particular occasion, (2) . . . was caused by an identifiable inci-
dent or sudden precipitating event, and (3) . . . resulted in an obvious 
mechanical or structural change in the human body.” An injury that 
is the result of the willful and intentional assault of either a fellow 
employee or a third person does not prevent the injury from being ac-
cidental within the meaning of the Act.168  
Thus, held the court, while as a general rule an intentional tort 
of an employer or a fellow employee would be found to be within 
the scope of the Virginia’s Workers’ Compensation Act and thus 
the employee’s exclusive remedy,169 the assault must be “personal 
to the employee and not directed against him as an employee or 
because of his employment.”170  
In Padilla’s case, her fellow employees both admitted that they 
were trying to get her to succumb to their sexual advances; thus, 
their assaults were of a personal nature, directed against Padilla 
as a woman, not as an employee.171 Therefore, the court concluded, 
the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar Padilla’s claim 
as her injuries did not arise out of employment as required by the 
Act.172 Further, held the court, Padilla “sufficiently alleged physi-
cal and emotional injuries resulting from physical and sexual 
abuse” by her fellow employees, their alleged conduct was outra-
geous, and they intended to cause her distress by continued sexual 
assault and harassment.173 Thus, the defendant employer’s demur-
rer was overruled.174 
In summary, if an assault, including sexual harassment, is not 
directed against an employee because of his or her employment, 
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then it does not “arise out of the employment.”175 In those circum-
stances, if an employee brings an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim arising from such an assault or harassment, the Vir-
ginia Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar these claims be-
cause the injury is not a compensable injury by accident.176 
III.  BACK TO THE BEGINNING:  APPLYING VIRGINIA LAW TO 
BODEWIG 
When we left our protagonist, Linda Bodewig, she had filed a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her 
employer after Bodewig was strip-searched in an effort to assuage 
a customer’s concerns that she had stolen the customer’s money.177 
Like other courts, the Oregon courts applied the same four ele-
ments of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) 
intent; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) a causal connection between the 
conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress 
was severe.178 The Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that a jury could find 
the employer acted intentionally, and that the manager’s conduct 
went “beyond the limits of social toleration and reckless of the con-
duct’s predictable effects” on Linda Bodewig.179 Having satisfied 
the tort elements of intentionally engaging in outrageous conduct, 
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the court then turned to the elements of causation and severe emo-
tional distress, and held as follows: 
If the facts presented are believed, plaintiff suffered shock, humilia-
tion and embarrassment, suffering that was not merely transient. 
Plaintiff characterized herself as a shy, modest person, and said that 
she had two or three sleepless nights, cried a lot and still gets nervous 
and upset when she thinks about the incident. Concededly, this ele-
ment of the tort has been, and still is, troublesome to courts. K-Mart 
contends there is no objective evidence of the distress, such as medical, 
economic or social problems. In Rockhill v. Pollard, . . . plaintiff be-
came nervous and suffered from sleeplessness and a loss of appetite 
over a period of about two years. The court said: “Defendant belittles 
these symptoms, but it is the distress which must be severe, not the 
physical manifestations.”180 
The court concluded that Bodewig’s distress “was more than that 
which a person might be reasonably expected to pay as the price of 
living among people.”181 The court concluded that Bodewig’s evi-
dence of severe emotional distress was sufficient to go to a jury.182 
But what if Linda Bodewig was not an Oregon resident, but ra-
ther a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia? How would she 
have fared then? 
First, it seems clear that Bodewig could meet the first three ele-
ments of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 
a somewhat analogous case decided in Virginia last year, Calloway 
v. Commonwealth, the Augusta County Circuit Court evaluated 
the claim of a visitor to a detention facility who was subjected to a 
strip search.183 There, the court said: 
It cannot be seriously contested that Calloway has pled the first three 
elements of IIED. First, she alleges that the VDOC employees acted 
intentionally, i.e., that they knew they had no legal reason to detain 
her or subject her to a strip search; a jury could reasonably conclude 
that an officer should have known that an unwarranted strip search 
could likely cause emotional distress. Second, an unjustified strip 
search strikes the Court as so invasive a procedure that any reasona-
ble person could (perhaps would) describe it as “outrageous,” if not 
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justified. Finally, Calloway clearly alleges a causal connection be-
tween the VDOC employees’ conduct and the stress she claims. Those 
issues properly are jury questions.184 
However, turning to the fourth element of the tort, severity, 
which the court characterized as “perhaps the most difficult to ap-
ply to the facts of a case,” the court held that the plaintiff failed to 
carry her burden.185 Even though Calloway “was upset, and crying” 
and “shocked, frightened, and felt degraded and humiliated”186 
when she was subjected to the strip search, the court rejected her 
claim that she suffered severe emotional distress under the Russo 
standard.187 
Recall that Patricia Russo experienced “nervousness, sleepless-
ness, [and] stress.”188 Similarly, Linda Bodewig experienced nerv-
ousness, sleeplessness, and stress.189 However, under the standard 
set forth in Russo v. White, Bodewig would fail to meet the fourth 
prong of the tort. She had no objective physical injury caused by 
the stress, she didn’t seek medical attention, nor was she was con-
fined at home or in a medical facility.190  
Bodewig might also face an argument by the defendant em-
ployer, K-Mart, that the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act pro-
vided her exclusive remedy. The actions of the K-Mart manager in 
subjecting her to a strip search at her place of employment, during 
working hours, and in circumstances directly related to her em-
ployment (specifically, in response to a customer’s accusation of 
theft by the employee), arguably led to her injury “by accident aris-
ing out of and in the course of employment.”191 Bodewig’s counter 
argument would be that there was no accident giving rise to an 
injury, and that would seem to be a convincing argument under the 
precedent set by Middlekauff v. Allstate Insurance. Company192 as 
discussed above.  
So let’s assume the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers’ 
Compensation Act would not bar Linda Bodewig’s intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim. As noted above, Bodewig would 
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not prevail in Virginia as she did in Oregon because of the exacting 
requirements of Russo. But why should this be the case, given the 
numerous Virginia circuit court holdings that employees who suf-
fer from sexual harassment can prevail without meeting Russo’s 
additional requirement of the tort’s fourth prong? More critically, 
why should this additional requirement be the law at all, since, as 
Justice Hassell made clear in his Russo dissent, physical injury is 
not a necessary element under traditional intentional infliction of 
emotional distress analysis? Frankly, it seems an odd result that a 
woman like Linda Bodewig, who is strip searched and who suffers 
the predicable response of sleeplessness, nervousness, and stress, 
will not recover damages, while an employee who is subjected to 
repeated propositioning at work, like Annemarie Padilla, can suc-
ceed on her claim. 
A brief review of a century of Virginia court decisions concerning 
the issue of damages for emotional distress, arising in various tort 
contexts, shows that the Virginia courts have not been rigid in 
their approach, but rather have shifted their analysis over time as 
we gain a better appreciation for the nuances of mental suffering—
what causes it, how it manifests itself, and what constitutes sever-
ity. This shift is evidenced, for example, in negligence cases, where 
the court abandoned the requirement of physical impact and 
moved to the broader standard of finding injury from “the natural 
result of fright or shock.”193 No argument is made here to change 
the four basic elements of the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim. Requiring a plaintiff to show that a defendant in-
tentionally engaged in outrageous conduct, that which “shocks the 
conscience,” is a fair burden; it is a standard that is appropriately 
difficult to meet (although as societal standards change, outra-
geousness may be even harder to demonstrate). But the question 
of what constitutes “severe emotional distress,” caused by the de-
fendant, is one that the Virginia courts should show a willingness 
to reconsider. Lower courts have done so in some recent sexual har-
assment cases. Abandoning the extra burden Russo places on 
plaintiffs would lead to a better, fairer result in all circumstances 
involving employer and employee, not just in sexual harassment 
claims. The result would be a better workplace and a more bal-
anced view of employee rights. Let us hope Virginia revisits the 
question again soon. 
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